clash-party/docs/plugin/PROVIDER_INTEGRATION_v2.md

Clash Party Provider Integration v2

Client spec: cpx-plugin/2.

Chinese reference document: 机场服务端对接指南-v2.md.

Related files:

• Reference gateway: deploy/gateway/
• Sign test vectors: src/main/resolve/plugin/__fixtures__/sign-vectors.json

During development there was an earlier v1 design (password + encrypted container). That design has been retired, and the current codebase does not include a v1 implementation.

---

1. Integration Model

The client must not receive the real subscription URL, API host, or origin token.

The user imports a public .cpx descriptor. Login happens in the system browser. The client generates an Ed25519 device key pair locally. Subscription updates then use a gateway challenge/config flow.

Provider-side components:

Component	Host	Purpose
OAuth authorize endpoint	Login host from .cpx loginUrl	User login and one-time code issuance
/.well-known/cpx-gateway	Same host and port as loginUrl	Current gateway origin and endpoint paths
Gateway endpoints	Gateway host; may differ from login host	Device enrollment, nonce, config, revocation

The login host is the trust root and is fixed in distributed .cpx files. The gateway host is discovered at runtime and can be rotated by updating the well-known document.

Failure behavior:

Failed host	Result
Gateway host	Client can rediscover through the login host
Login host	Existing devices can keep using the cached gateway; new login, re-login, and rediscovery fail
Both	Client is disconnected; redistribute a new .cpx

Flow:

Install:
  Import .cpx
  Validate descriptor
  Create local record; no network request yet

Login:
  1. GET https://<login-host>/.well-known/cpx-gateway
  2. Generate Ed25519 device key pair and deviceId(UUIDv4)
  3. Open system browser:
     loginUrl?response_type=code&code_challenge=...&state=...
  4. Provider login page redirects to:
     http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback?code=...&state=...
  5. POST {gateway}/enroll with code and PKCE verifier
  6. POST {gateway}/challenge
  7. POST {gateway}/config with Ed25519 signature
  8. Store returned Clash YAML as a normal profile

Update:
  Repeat challenge -> config. No browser is opened.

Re-login:
  Gateway returns {"error":"revoked"} or {"error":"device_revoked"}.
  Client marks the profile as needs re-authentication.

Delete:
  Client best-effort calls /revoke, then deletes local state.

---

2. Reference Gateway

deploy/gateway/ is the reference implementation. It includes Docker deployment, a SQLite account store, and cpx-admin.

Important files:

File	Purpose
deploy/gateway/src/auth.mjs	authorize page and one-time codes
deploy/gateway/src/gateway.mjs	enroll/challenge/config/revoke
deploy/gateway/src/crypto.mjs	PKCE, Ed25519, canonical sign input
deploy/gateway/src/origin.mjs	hidden-origin subscription fetch

For an existing panel, the usual additions are:

1. A device binding table: user_id, device_id, device_pubkey, created_at.
2. Pending nonce storage: Redis, memory, or database; short TTL; delete after use.
3. An OAuth authorize endpoint backed by the existing login system.
4. /.well-known/cpx-gateway.
5. Four gateway endpoints that call existing user-status and subscription-generation logic.

---

3. .cpx Descriptor

.cpx is public JSON. Use one file for all users. It must not contain user data, tokens, API hosts, gateway hosts, or subscription URLs.

{
  "magic": "CPXF",
  "v": 2,
  "spec": "cpx-plugin/2",
  "loginUrl": "https://panel.example.com/oauth/authorize",
  "provider": {
    "name": "Example",
    "icon": "...",
    "site": "https://example.com"
  }
}

Field rules:

Field	Rule
magic	String "CPXF"
v	Number 2
spec	String "cpx-plugin/2"
Top-level keys	Only magic, v, spec, loginUrl, provider, discoveryUrls, providerPubKey
loginUrl	HTTPS URL; no query, fragment, or userinfo; host must not be private, loopback, localhost, or *.localhost
discoveryUrls	Optional. 1..8 public HTTPS origins (no path/query/fragment/userinfo), deduplicated, none equal to the loginUrl origin. Backup discovery sources, see §5. Only clients from the release that added it accept this key; older clients reject the file
providerPubKey	Optional. Ed25519 raw 32-byte public key, standard base64 with padding. Once present the client requires a signed discovery document (§5a) and rejects unsigned ones. Use one key per .cpx lineage. Older clients reject the file
provider	Object; only name, icon, site, description
provider.name	Required non-empty string
provider.icon	Optional data URI; only PNG/JPEG/WEBP; total string length <= 65536
provider.site	Optional HTTPS URL; same host restrictions as loginUrl; path is allowed
provider.description	Optional string shown to the user; sanitized like error message (§6) and capped at 500 code points. Older clients reject the file

loginUrl is the OAuth authorize endpoint, not a generic login page. The client appends OAuth parameters to it.

Generator:

node scripts/plugin/gen-cpx.mjs <loginUrl> <providerName> [site] [output] [--discovery <origin>]...

--discovery may be repeated; each value becomes one entry of discoveryUrls.

Distribution Options

• File download: Distribute the .cpx file directly. Clients with the file association registered can launch the app by double-clicking the file and will see the plugin preview and confirmation page.

• Deep link: Host the same .cpx file at a public HTTPS URL, then use the following link in a web button or QR code:

  clash://install-plugin?url=https%3A%2F%2Fprovider.example.com%2Fapp.cpx
  

  mihomo:// is equivalent to clash://. URL-encode the url parameter. The client downloads and validates the file, installs the plugin, and opens the system browser for login. The download URL must use public HTTPS, redirects are rejected, and the file must not exceed 1 MiB.

---

4. OAuth Authorize

Use OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE(S256). The client opens the system browser. Credentials are submitted only to the provider page.

Client query parameters:

Parameter	Value
response_type	code
client_id	mihomo-party
redirect_uri	http://127.0.0.1:<random-port>/callback
code_challenge	BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)), no padding
code_challenge_method	S256
state	Random string; echo unchanged
scope	subscribe

Authorize endpoint requirements:

1. Allow loopback redirect URI http://127.0.0.1:<random-port>/callback. The port changes per login.
2. After successful login, redirect to redirect_uri?code=...&state=....
3. The issued code must be one-time and expire in no more than 60 seconds.
4. Store user_id, redirect_uri, client_id, and code_challenge with the code.
5. /enroll must compare stored redirect_uri and client_id byte-for-byte.

Loopback redirect uses HTTP for native apps; do not reject it for not being HTTPS. See RFC 8252.

---

5. Gateway Discovery

The client requests the exact host from loginUrl:

GET https://<login-host>/.well-known/cpx-gateway

Response:

{
  "spec": "cpx-plugin/2",
  "gateway": "https://gw.front.example.net",
  "gateways": ["https://gw.front.example.net", "https://gw2-cdn.example.com"],
  "endpoints": {
    "enroll": "/enroll",
    "challenge": "/challenge",
    "config": "/config",
    "revoke": "/revoke"
  }
}

Field rules:

Field	Rule
spec	String "cpx-plugin/2"
gateway	HTTPS origin only: scheme, host, optional port; no path, query, fragment, or userinfo; public host. Must equal the normalized gateways[0] when gateways is present
gateways	Optional. 1..3 HTTPS origins with the same rules as gateway, deduplicated. Absent → the client uses [gateway]. Any invalid entry, an empty list, or more than 3 entries invalidates the whole document
endpoints	Must contain enroll, challenge, config, revoke; each value is a relative path starting with /; no absolute URL, ?, #, or backslash. The same endpoints apply to every gateway

The discovery request uses HTTPS only, does not follow redirects, and caps the response body at 64 KiB. Non-2xx, invalid JSON, or invalid fields are discovery failures.

Old clients only read gateway; new clients read gateways and fall back to [gateway]. Generate both from the same list so they never disagree.

Multiple gateways must share state. All gateways must point at the same backend state (authorize codes, devices, nonces): the client may take a nonce from /challenge on one gateway and post /config on another after a timeout. The reference deployment terminates TLS for every gateway domain in Caddy and forwards them all to one gateway process; it does not support multiple replicas.

Gateway Rotation and Switching

To rotate gateways, update /.well-known/cpx-gateway.

Within one client operation (a complete business action such as challenge + config), the client tries the cached gateways in order — the last gateway that worked first, then the rest — and moves to the next candidate when the current one returns:

• HTTP 410 or JSON {"error":"gateway_retired"};
• a network-level failure: DNS failure, connection failure, TLS handshake failure;
• a timeout (no HTTP response at all).

Any HTTP response other than the retired marker stops the operation: plain 5xx, 429, or revoked are never reasons to try another gateway. Only when every cached gateway failed in the switch-worthy way does the client rediscover once and try the new list, skipping targets it already tried in the same operation (same origin and same endpoints). If that still fails the operation ends as transient and backs off.

Each gateway origin is also routed independently: the client may reach one gateway directly and another through its local proxy (see §6).

Rediscovery requires a discovery source to be reachable (the login host, and any discoveryUrls from the descriptor).

Multiple Discovery Sources

The login host is a single point of failure for rediscovery: if it is blocked, an enrolled device can no longer learn about a new gateway. The descriptor may therefore list backup sources in discoveryUrls (§3). They carry the same trust as loginUrl — both are static roots the user accepted at import time.

Discovery order is [origin of loginUrl, ...discoveryUrls]; every source is asked for https://<origin>/.well-known/cpx-gateway. Any failure at one source — network error, non-2xx, invalid JSON, invalid fields, or a client-side guard refusal — moves on to the next source; a backup may be a plain static file on a CDN, so 404 simply means "not provided here". When every source fails, the last error wins. Each source is its own origin, so route selection (§6) is independent per source.

A backup source only needs to serve the JSON document at that path over public HTTPS. Any CDN or object storage works, and the gateway itself already serves it, so listing a gateway origin in discoveryUrls is the simplest option. Backup sources help already-enrolled devices recover; a new login still needs the login host, because the OAuth page opens in the system browser.

5a. Signed Discovery Document

With providerPubKey in the descriptor the trust root moves from a host name to a key: a discovery document is accepted from anywhere — the login host, any gateway, a static CDN file, or the /config response — as long as it verifies under that key and its sequence number is not older than what the client already accepted. This makes the login host replaceable and lets gateways, endpoints, loginUrl and discoveryUrls rotate without touching the .cpx file.

Envelope. One string "<payloadB64>.<sigB64>":

• payloadB64: the UTF-8 bytes of the payload JSON, standard base64 with padding.
• sigB64: the Ed25519 signature (64 bytes) over "CPX2-DISCOVERY\0" || payloadBytes — the ASCII prefix followed by a NUL byte, then the exact payload bytes — standard base64 with padding. The prefix separates discovery documents from any other message signed with the same key.
• Exactly one .. Both halves must be canonical base64 (decoding and re-encoding reproduces the input). The payload is at most 4 KiB; after base64 and signature the envelope is about 5.6 KiB, inside the usual 8 KiB per-header limit of CDNs and reverse proxies.

The signer serializes the payload itself and signs those bytes; the client verifies the received bytes before parsing them. No canonicalization (JCS or similar) is involved on either side.

Payload.

{
  "spec": "cpx-plugin/2",
  "seq": 12,
  "gateways": ["https://gw1.example.net", "https://gw2-cdn.example.com"],
  "endpoints": {
    "enroll": "/enroll",
    "challenge": "/challenge",
    "config": "/config",
    "revoke": "/revoke"
  },
  "loginUrl": "https://panel-new.example.com/oauth/authorize",
  "discoveryUrls": ["https://gw2-cdn.example.com"]
}

Field	Rule
spec	"cpx-plugin/2"
seq	Integer, 1 ≤ seq ≤ 2^53−1. Strictly increase it on every change
gateways	Same rules as §5 (1..3 public HTTPS origins)
endpoints	Same rules as §5; an optional bootstrap path is reserved for a later phase
loginUrl	Optional; same rules as the descriptor field. When accepted it replaces the stored login URL; the next login opens the new one
discoveryUrls	Optional; absent = unchanged, [] = clear, otherwise the descriptor rules (1..8). When the payload also carries loginUrl, the list must not contain that URL's origin — the whole document is invalid otherwise, so remove it before signing. When the payload omits loginUrl, the client drops entries equal to its currently stored login origin at apply time

No other keys are allowed.

Where it is served — two places, same format, same verification:

1. The well-known document gains an optional top-level signed. Keep gateway / gateways / endpoints for unkeyed and older clients; a keyed client compares them with the payload and rejects the whole source if they disagree, so generate both from the same payload.
2. A successful /config response may carry the header X-CPX-Discovery: <payloadB64>.<sigB64>. Send it as a single header value; the client ignores repeated headers.

What the client does.

providerPubKey in .cpx	signed in well-known	Behaviour
no	any	unsigned path (§5); signed and X-CPX-Discovery are ignored
yes	no	this source fails (downgrade protection); the next source is tried
yes	yes	verify → parse → sequence check → apply

The client stores the last accepted seq together with the SHA-256 of the payload bytes. For an incoming document: no stored value → accept; seq higher → accept; same seq and same digest → accept as an idempotent re-application; same seq but a different digest → reject (two different documents with one number, e.g. inconsistent CDN copies); lower seq → reject. A rejected well-known source is skipped like any other discovery failure. A rejected or malformed X-CPX-Discovery header is only logged: the authenticated /config response is never discarded because of it.

The sequence number protects against the network replaying an older document; it is not a defense against someone with write access to the client's own files.

Applying an accepted document. Gateways and endpoints go into the client's encrypted cache first; then loginUrl, discoveryUrls, seq and the digest are written to the plugin record in one step. The sequence number is the commit marker: if anything fails in between, the marker does not advance and the next arrival of the same document repairs the record idempotently. On a fresh login the discovery document is applied before the browser opens, so a rotated loginUrl takes effect immediately and a cancelled login cannot be talked back into an older document afterwards.

Key management. Sign offline. The gateway process holds no private key; it only serves a pre-signed envelope file (DISCOVERY_SIGNED_FILE in the reference gateway, used both for signed and for the header). cpx-admin keygen and cpx-admin sign-discovery <payload.json> (or scripts/plugin/sign-discovery.mjs) read the seed from a file or stdin, never from the command line. Use a separate key for every .cpx lineage: documents signed with the same key are interchangeable between the plugins that share it. Key rotation is not part of this version — a lost or leaked key means issuing a new .cpx.

Publish order. Serve the signed well-known first, then distribute the .cpx containing providerPubKey. In the other order every keyed client fails discovery until signed appears.

---

6. Gateway Common Rules

All gateway endpoints are POST with JSON request bodies. The client uses HTTPS only, does not follow redirects, and caps responses at 10 MiB.

No Authorization header is used. No bearer token is issued. Device identity is based on deviceId, the stored Ed25519 public key, and request signatures.

Client error classification:

Class	Condition	Client action
retired	HTTP 410, or JSON {"error":"gateway_retired"}	Try the next cached gateway; rediscover once when all are exhausted
revoked	JSON {"error":"revoked"} or {"error":"device_revoked"}	Mark as needs re-authentication
unreachable	DNS failure, connection failure, TLS handshake failure	Try the next route, then the next gateway; rediscover once when exhausted
transient	Other non-2xx (5xx, 429, bare 401/403), or a timeout	Timeout: next route / next gateway. Any HTTP response: back off and retry
blocked	The gateway host resolved to a private/loopback address (client-side guard, nothing is sent)	Back off; the user must fix the target or explicitly choose proxy mode
success	2xx without an error marker	Continue

For expired accounts, disabled users, or revoked devices, include revoked or device_revoked in the JSON body. A bare 401 or 403 is treated as transient.

Optional message. Any error JSON may add a human-readable message that the client shows on the plugin card next to its own fixed status text:

{
  "error": "revoked",
  "message": "Your subscription expired on 2026-09-01. Renew and log in again."
}

The client only reads message when it is a string; it trims it, strips control characters except newline (U+000A), truncates to 200 code points, and treats an empty result as absent. It is rendered as plain text (no Markdown, no links). The message is stored with the plugin until the next successful operation clears it. The same sanitizing rules apply to the static provider.description in .cpx (cap 500 code points), which is shown on the install page and on the card.

Routes. Each request leaves the client either directly or through the user's local proxy. In the default auto mode the client remembers the route that last worked for a plugin, tries it first, and switches to the other one only on a network-level failure or a timeout — never on an HTTP response. Stickiness is per origin: once a gateway origin has answered on a route, the rest of the operation keeps using that route for it. Before any request goes through the proxy, the client resolves the gateway host locally and refuses hosts that resolve to private addresses (blocked). Two residual risks remain, both shared with the explicit proxy mode: DNS rebinding between that check and the proxy's own lookup, and hosts that fail to resolve locally are still allowed through the proxy.

/enroll is never replayed. The authorize code is consumed by the first request that reaches the gateway. The client therefore only tries another route or another gateway for /enroll when the request provably never left the client (connection refused / DNS / TLS failure before the request was written). A timeout, a connection reset after sending, or any HTTP response ends the login; the user simply logs in again for a fresh code.

---

7. POST {gateway}/enroll

Purpose: exchange an authorize code for a device binding. This is similar to OAuth token exchange, but no bearer token is returned.

Request:

{
  "code": "<authorize code>",
  "code_verifier": "<PKCE verifier>",
  "redirect_uri": "http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback",
  "client_id": "mihomo-party",
  "devicePubKey": "<base64 Ed25519 public key>",
  "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>"
}

Server steps:

1. Find code; verify it is unexpired and unused.
2. Verify PKCE: BASE64URL(SHA256(code_verifier)) == code_challenge.
3. Compare redirect_uri and client_id with the stored values byte-for-byte.
4. Resolve user_id from the code.
5. Store (user_id, deviceId, devicePubKey).
6. Mark the code as used.
7. Return 2xx, for example {"ok":true}.

Notes:

• deviceId is client-generated. Do not replace it.
• A user may have multiple devices. Apply a device-count limit or cleanup policy.
• If enroll succeeds but the first config fetch fails, keep the device binding.
• Re-login creates a new key pair and a new device binding. The client then revokes the device it replaced (see §10), so a user who logs in repeatedly on one machine does not accumulate bindings.

---

8. POST {gateway}/challenge

Purpose: issue a one-time nonce for a device.

Request:

{ "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>" }

Success response:

{
  "nonceId": "<opaque id>",
  "nonce": "<base64 32 bytes>",
  "exp": 60
}

Rules:

• Keep a pending-nonce pool per deviceId.
• Allow several pending nonces for concurrency.
• nonce is 32 cryptographically random bytes.
• TTL should be no more than 60 seconds.
• Delete nonce after use; clean expired nonces.
• Limit pending nonces per device, for example 8.
• nonceId is an opaque visible ASCII handle, length <= 64, with no spaces or control characters.
• nonce uses standard base64 with = padding; decoded length must be exactly 32 bytes.
• exp is informational.

For an unknown device, expired account, or revoked device, return:

{ "error": "revoked" }

---

9. POST {gateway}/config

Purpose: verify the device signature and return the user's Clash YAML.

Request:

{
  "deviceId": "<UUIDv4>",
  "nonceId": "<challenge nonceId>",
  "nonce": "<challenge nonce>",
  "ts": 1700000000000,
  "sig": "<base64 Ed25519 signature>"
}

Server steps:

1. Look up the pending nonce by deviceId and nonceId.
2. Verify request nonce matches the stored value.
3. Verify the nonce is unexpired and unconsumed.
4. Check clock skew: abs(now_ms - ts) <= 300000.
5. Load devicePubKey for the device.
6. Build the canonical sign input from section 11 with op=1.
7. Verify the Ed25519 signature.
8. Consume the nonce.
9. Resolve user_id from deviceId.
10. Generate the subscription internally or fetch it from a hidden origin.
11. Return HTTP 200 with Clash YAML as the response body.

Successful /config response is not JSON. The client parses it as Clash YAML and requires an object containing at least proxies or proxy-providers.

A successful response may additionally carry the header X-CPX-Discovery: <payloadB64>.<sigB64> (§5a). The client reads it only for plugins with providerPubKey, only as a single header value, and a failed verification is logged and ignored — the YAML body is still applied.

Do not return the subscription URL, origin API host, or origin token.

---

10. POST {gateway}/revoke

Purpose: unbind a device. The client calls it best-effort in two situations:

• the user deletes the plugin — for the current device and any device still waiting in the list below;
• a re-login replaced the device — for the previous device, signed with the previous key, right after the login completes. If that call fails, the client keeps the old credentials and retries after later successful /config fetches, one device per attempt.

A /challenge answer of revoked / device_revoked for the old device counts as "already unbound" and ends the retries. Nothing new is required of the gateway beyond §7 and the idempotency rule below; the only visible change is that /revoke now also arrives after re-logins, for a device that is no longer the account's newest one — unbind that deviceId only.

Request body is the same as /config.

Use the same verification flow as /config, but build the sign input with op=2. After successful verification, remove the deviceId binding and consume the nonce.

/revoke must be idempotent. Return 2xx even if the device is already absent.

---

11. Device Signature

Canonical sign input:

SignInput = "CPX2"                              // 4 bytes ASCII
          | uint8(op)                           // config=1, revoke=2
          | uint8(len(deviceId)) | deviceId     // UTF-8 bytes
          | uint8(len(nonceId))  | nonceId      // UTF-8 bytes
          | nonce                               // 32 raw bytes
          | uint64_be(ts)                       // Unix milliseconds

Signature:

sig = Ed25519_sign(devicePrivKey, SignInput)

sig is 64 raw bytes on input to standard base64.

Implementation notes:

• Decode nonce from base64 before adding it to SignInput.
• Encode ts as an 8-byte unsigned big-endian integer.
• deviceId and nonceId length prefixes are one unsigned byte.
• /config uses op=1; /revoke uses op=2.

---

12. Wire Encoding

Field	Encoding
devicePubKey	Ed25519 public key, 32 raw bytes, standard base64 with padding
sig	Ed25519 signature, 64 raw bytes, standard base64 with padding
nonce	32 raw bytes, standard base64 with padding, usually 44 chars
deviceId	UUIDv4, 36 lowercase chars with hyphens; server cap <= 64
nonceId	Server-generated opaque visible ASCII, length <= 64
ts	Integer, Unix milliseconds
op	uint8; config=1, revoke=2
code	Opaque authorize code, length <= 2048
code_challenge / code_verifier	RFC 7636 base64url, no padding; verifier length 43-128, charset [A-Za-z0-9-._~]
providerPubKey	Ed25519 public key, 32 raw bytes, standard base64 with padding
signed / X-CPX-Discovery	<payloadB64>.<sigB64>; both halves canonical standard base64 with padding

Only PKCE fields use base64url without padding. Binary protocol fields use standard base64 with padding.

---

13. PHP Snippet

PKCE:

function pkce_ok(string $verifier, string $challenge): bool {
    $calc = rtrim(strtr(base64_encode(hash('sha256', $verifier, true)), '+/', '-_'), '=');
    return hash_equals($challenge, $calc);
}

Signature verification:

function build_sign_input(int $op, string $deviceId, string $nonceId, string $nonceRaw, int $tsMs): string {
    return "CPX2"
        . chr($op)
        . chr(strlen($deviceId)) . $deviceId
        . chr(strlen($nonceId)) . $nonceId
        . $nonceRaw
        . pack('J', $tsMs); // uint64 big-endian
}

$nonceRaw = base64_decode($req['nonce'], true);
$pub      = base64_decode($devicePubKeyB64, true);
$sig      = base64_decode($req['sig'], true);
$ts       = (int)$req['ts'];

if ($nonceRaw === false || $pub === false || $sig === false) { /* 400 */ }
if (strlen($nonceRaw) !== 32 || strlen($pub) !== 32 || strlen($sig) !== 64) { /* 400 */ }
if (abs((int)(microtime(true) * 1000) - $ts) > 300000) { /* 400 */ }

// Also check nonceId/nonce belongs to deviceId and is unexpired/unconsumed.

$op    = ($endpoint === 'config') ? 1 : 2;
$input = build_sign_input($op, $req['deviceId'], $req['nonceId'], $nonceRaw, $ts);
$ok    = sodium_crypto_sign_verify_detached($sig, $input, $pub);
if (!$ok) { /* 401 or 400 */ }

// Consume nonce after successful verification.

Revocation response:

http_response_code(403);
header('Content-Type: application/json');
echo json_encode(['error' => 'revoked']);

---

Signed discovery document (§5a), done offline:

$payload = json_encode($doc, JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES); // sign exactly these bytes
$sig     = sodium_crypto_sign_detached("CPX2-DISCOVERY\0" . $payload, $secretKey);
$signed  = base64_encode($payload) . '.' . base64_encode($sig);
// providerPubKey for the .cpx: base64_encode(sodium_crypto_sign_publickey($keypair))

---

14. Test Vectors

File:

src/main/resolve/plugin/__fixtures__/sign-vectors.json

Each vector contains:

• op
• deviceId
• nonceId
• privSeedB64
• pubKeyB64
• nonceB64
• ts
• inputHex
• sigB64

Verify:

1. Your canonical input hex equals inputHex.
2. sigB64 verifies under pubKeyB64.

Regenerate vectors:

node scripts/plugin/gen-sign-vectors.mjs

Signed discovery vectors (§5a):

src/main/resolve/plugin/__fixtures__/discovery-vectors.json

Each entry contains seedB64, pubKeyB64, payloadJson, payloadB64, signInputHex (prefix + payload), sigB64, signed and digestHex. Verify that signing signInputHex with the seed reproduces sigB64, that signed verifies under pubKeyB64, and that SHA-256 of the payload bytes equals digestHex. Regenerate with node scripts/plugin/gen-discovery-vectors.mjs.

---

15. Launch Checklist

Descriptor:

• .cpx contains only valid v2 fields.
• loginUrl is an HTTPS authorize endpoint with no query, fragment, or userinfo.
• Optional icon uses an allowed data URI format and size.

Login host:

• /.well-known/cpx-gateway returns valid JSON.
• authorize accepts http://127.0.0.1:<random-port>/callback.
• successful login redirects with code and original state.
• code is one-time and TTL <= 60 seconds.
• code stores redirect_uri, client_id, and code_challenge.

Gateway:

• gateway is a public HTTPS origin.
• if gateways is present it lists 1..3 public HTTPS origins and gateway equals gateways[0].
• every listed gateway reaches the same backend state (codes, devices, nonces); no independent replicas.
• if the .cpx carries providerPubKey: the well-known already serves signed, the top-level fields match the payload, and the signed document went live before the .cpx was distributed.
• endpoint paths are relative and contain no backslash, query, or fragment.
• /enroll verifies PKCE, code, redirect URI, and client ID.
• /challenge issues 32-byte standard-base64 nonce values with short TTL and pool limits.
• /config verifies nonce, clock skew, signature, consumes nonce, and returns Clash YAML.
• /revoke verifies with op=2, consumes nonce, and idempotently unbinds the device.
• account/device revocation returns {"error":"revoked"} or {"error":"device_revoked"}.
• gateway retirement returns HTTP 410 or {"error":"gateway_retired"}.

Compatibility:

• devicePubKey, sig, and nonce use standard base64 with padding.
• PKCE uses base64url without padding.
• sign input uses raw nonce bytes, not the base64 string.
• ts is encoded as uint64 big-endian.
• implementation passes sign-vectors.json.

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16. Logging

Do not log:

• authorize code
• code_verifier
• nonce or nonceId
• user password or raw login form
• subscription URL, origin token, or full Clash YAML

Safe operational fields include user_id, deviceId, endpoint name, status code, duration, and gateway version.